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We do not learn much about emergencies and law by reading Bruce
Ackerman's new book on the subject,' or so I will suggest. The book is not
without value, but its value is not what its author intended. The book
stumbles into a methodological pitfall, one that claims many victims, by
offering a self-defeating proposal: the diagnosis that Ackerman offers itself
rules out the prescription that he suggests. Proposals defeat themselves
when the motives, beliefs, or political opportunities ascribed to relevant
actors by the theorist's diagnosis are incompatible with the solution that the
theorist offers. The value of the book, then, is that it provides a
methodological cautionary tale.
Part I offers a brief precis of the book and examines its diagnosis of the
pathologies of emergency politics. Although my main interest is in the
logical connection between Ackerman's premises and conclusions, not in
the truth of his premises, I will offer some reasons to think that those
premises are wrong or at best overblown, where they are sufficiently
specific to be evaluated at all. Part II begins with some general remarks on
self-defeating proposals, and then explains that Ackerman's proposals are
self-defeating. The motives, beliefs and emotional states, and political
constraints that Ackerman describes in the diagnosis also rule out his
proposals for a framework statute governing emergencies.
I. DIAGNOSIS
Ackerman argues that Congress should pass an emergency powers statute
that authorizes the President to exercise increased powers in the case of
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. This paper was prepared for Fordham Law
School's conference "A New Constitutional Order?," held March 24-25, 2006. I draw on
work done jointly with Eric A. Posner, particularly Accommodating Emergencies, 56 Stan.
L. Rev. 605 (2003), and Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts
(forthcoming 2006). Any errors are mine alone. Thanks to Adam Cox, Daryl Levinson,
Martha Minow, and Cass Sunstein for helpful discussion and comments, and to Abigail
Moncrieff and Andrea Paul for excellent research assistance.
1. Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of
Terrorism (2006).
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emergency. 2 Roughly, and omitting some details, the proposal goes as
follows. During the emergency, the executive's power is expanded but
hardly unlimited. Ackerman's proposal is not clear in every detail, but he
seems to grant the executive the power to detain people without permitting
them to challenge the factual basis of their detentions.3  Torture is
forbidden; limited rights to hearings remain. 4 Detainees must be released
after forty-five days if the government cannot connect them to the
emergency. 5
To curb executive abuse of power, the framework statute would create a
"supermajoritarian escalator" providing that, as time passes, the grant of
emergency powers continues only if an increasingly large majority of
Congress consents. 6 At first the executive has the power to declare an
emergency, and for a short period--one or two weeks-he has the power to
act unilaterally. 7 At the end of this period, the state of emergency expires
unless a majority of Congress votes to sustain it.8 After another two or
three months pass, the state of emergency expires unless sixty percent of
Congress votes to sustain it.9 These periodic votes continue with an
escalating supermajority requirement topping out at eighty percent.10
Finally, Ackerman creates various other mechanisms and processes, such as
power sharing and information sharing, that are designed to prevent
executive abuses. I1
Ackerman says that his scheme avoids the undesirable consequences of
two alternatives. One alternative is the civil-libertarian view that terrorism
is a crime that can be dealt with through the ordinary criminal-justice
system, perhaps with relatively modest tweaks like expanded definitions of
conspiracy and related offenses. 12  Ackerman thinks that the civil-
libertarian view prevents the President from responding forcefully to an
emergency. 13 On the other hand, Ackerman vehemently rejects the idea
that the executive branch should be given free rein during emergencies. 14
Excessive deference to the President, in Ackerman's opinion, risks the
ratchet-like entrenchment of emergency powers. "It is precisely this
rhetoric [of a 'war on terror'] that will encourage courts to rubber-stamp
presidential decisions to respond to terrorist attacks with escalating cycles
of repression. If the courts don't challenge the language of war, they will
2. See generally id.
3. See id. at 4-5.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 4-5.





11. See id. at 83-87, 90-96.
12. See generally id. at 39-57.
13. See generally id. at 41-44.
14. See generally id. at 19-22.
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ultimately acquiesce in the permanent destruction of our liberties.' 15
Ackerman's proposal allows the President to respond forcefully to an
emergency without enabling him to maintain his emergency powers after
the emergency ends.
Ackerman provides neither a convincing diagnosis of a political problem
during emergencies nor a convincing defense of his proposed remedy. I
begin with the diagnosis. Although my chief interest is the relationship
between Ackerman's diagnosis and his prescriptions, the diagnosis itself is
both vague and-where it is clear--overblown.
What are the problems for which the framework statute is a solution?
Here Ackerman ig decidedly vague, offering a potpourri of half-formed
suggestions without any theoretical elaboration. We may group the
suggestions together as follows:
Panics. After terrorist attacks, people panic; legislators either panic
themselves or are politically constrained to behave as though panicky.
Panicky lawmakers enact bad legislation, meaning unnecessarily oppressive
and liberty-restricting legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act. 16 When
the emergency has passed regret sets in, but the cycle will repeat itself
during the next emergency.
Agency slack and executive despotism. Panic is a problem of
systematically skewed cognition, arising from emotional influences. A
separate problem is political opportunism. Presidents are only loosely
constrained by electoral politics and democratic institutions; they enjoy
agency slack vis-d-vis their voter-principals. Presidents use this agency
slack to aggrandize themselves, expanding their own power at the expense
of legislatures, courts, and other institutions. In emergencies, the executive
is given extra leeway; opportunism and the expansion of the security state
become all the more likely.
Majoritarian oppression. Perhaps democratic majorities will cause
government officials to oppress aliens, dissenters, and outsiders during
emergencies. This picture differs from the panic suggestion because it
accepts that government officials are rational, albeit self-interested; it
differs from the agency-slack suggestion because it accepts that officials act
as constrained and therefore faithful agents for democratic majorities or the
median voter. On this picture, government chooses security policy
rationally, but its goal is to maximize the welfare of current democratic
majorities rather than the overall welfare of the polity, and it fails to respect
minority rights.
Ratchets. Ackerman often insinuates that emergency policymaking
displays a ratchet effect: Increases in security are irreversible or at least
costly to reverse, and thus accumulate over time in a "downward cycle."' 7
Government will increase security and decrease liberty during emergencies,
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id. at 2.
17. See id. at 2.
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but will never readjust by increasing liberty after the emergency passes, or
at least will do so less than it should. In a closely related version, policies
that increase security in one domain will spill over into other domains. In
either case, the ratchet theory predicts an irreversible trend towards an
oppressively authoritarian regime. Thus Ackerman hints darkly of an
impending police state: "[President Bush's] lawyers are building the
constitutional foundation for military despotism .... [The Padilla case]
opens up the prospect of a legal order worthy of Stalinist Russia."1 8
All of these suggestions are under-specified and unconvincing. 19 They
lack theoretically respectable causal mechanisms, ignore offsetting benefits,
or rest on evidence that is at best ambiguous, and in some cases clearly cuts
against the diagnosis Ackerman offers. Perhaps better mechanisms and
evidence could be adduced, but in its current form the diagnosis is merely
polemical.
Panics. Ackerman never considers the benefits of fear, even of panic, in
individual and collective decisionmaking. Fear can improve
decisionmaking as well as hamper it, because fear supplies motivation that
can overcome preexisting inertia. In some circumstances fear can even
improve cognition by sharpening the assessment of threats that do exist, or
by inducing biased reactions that are in fact desirable if the costs of
ignoring a real threat are higher than the costs of overreacting to an unreal
one. Moreover, panic has no inherent valence in relation to security.
Although there are security panics, which cause government to supply
excessive security, there are also libertarian panics, which cause
government to supply inadequate security measures. The alarmist rhetorical
style of Ackerman's book, with its breathless warnings of executive
tyranny, is symptomatic: Ackerman is a victim of libertarian panic, or else
an entrepreneur of libertarian panic who invokes the "phantoms of lost
liberty" 20 in order to mobilize support for his proposals. In any event, even
if the only panics are security panics, there is no class of decisionmakers
who can be insulated from panic at acceptable cost, not even judges.
Ackerman seems to agree with the last point, occasionally expressing
sensible skepticism about the ability of courts to take a stand in favor of
civil liberties during emergencies, although we will see that Ackerman
reverses his ground on this point when necessary to patch up the argument.
Agency slack and executive despotism. Ackerman largely assumes that
executives will abuse their power and become dictators unless a statute such
as his constrains them,21 but he provides no evidence for thinking that this
is true. There are, of course, historical episodes in other countries when
executives founded dictatorships by extending indefinitely powers that were
18. Id. at 26.
19. For an extended treatment, see the works cited supra note *.
20. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 313 (2001)
(statement of John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen.).
21. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 1, at 6.
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granted temporarily. But no such episodes exist in American history, and it
is hazardous to assume that what happened in ancient Rome or Weimar
Germany will repeat itself in the United States today. Even during
emergencies, in the United States the national legislature and the judiciary
retain substantial powers; America's federal system would complicate any
attempt by a President to draw together all the strings of power; media that
are traditionally skeptical of executive power would need to be shut down;
a robust civil society-churches, clubs, universities, civic organizations-
would need to squelched. A dictatorship is not a serious possibility in the
United States anytime soon. In any event, were dictatorship a real
possibility, it is unlikely that a statute such as Ackerman's could prevent it,
as I discuss below.
Finally, even if there is a serious risk that an American President would
become a dictator as a result of an emergency, one must balance this risk
against the gains from granting the emergency powers to the President-
namely, the ability to address the threat swiftly and decisively, and without
compromising intelligence sources. Ackerman implicitly acknowledges
these benefits-that is presumably why he advocates giving the President
unilateral emergency power in the first weeks and then thereafter as long as
Congress acquiesces. Short of the specter of dictatorship, which gives civil-
libertarians a frisson but is not a concern in America in 2006, executive
abuses in times of war and emergency are just a cost to be weighed against
other benefits. But Ackerman does not provide any detail about the gains
side of the ledger.
Majoritarian oppression. Ackerman seemingly assumes that oppression
of minorities increases during emergencies.2 2 But why? The structures of
voting and representation that are said to produce majoritarian oppression
are the same in both emergencies and normal times. Minorities
undoubtedly are scapegoated during emergencies, but they are during
normal times as well, albeit in less visible ways. There is little evidence,
and no theoretical reason to believe, that majoritarian oppression is on net
more likely in emergencies; indeed, minorities often fare especially well
during emergencies because government has more need of their
contributions. Emergencies are often the engine of progressive change
because times of crisis demand good policy. 23
Moreover, majoritarian oppression need not produce excessive security;
it can also produce excessive liberty. There exists a form of libertarian
oppression, analogous to the libertarian panic. Libertarian oppression arises
when self-interested majorities cause government to supply political
minorities with inadequate protection from third-party threats, such as
terrorism. Consider the possibility that government, responding to self-
interested voters from "red" states, provides inadequate protection to
22. See, e.g., id. at 85.
23. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Political Change: A Reply to
Tushnet, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1593, 1594 (2004).
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"blue"-state urban centers that are the likeliest targets for terrorist attack,
and in this sense supplies excessive liberty in areas where political
minorities are concentrated.
Finally, just as the judges are too weak a reed to act as a bulwark against
panic, so too the costs of the searching judicial review recommended by the
majoritarian-oppression theory increase during emergencies to unacceptable
levels. The judges know all this, which is why they defer heavily to
government in times of emergency, even with respect to emergency policies
that theorists of majoritarian oppression find, in hindsight, to be infected
with animus or opportunism. Again, for the most part Ackerman seems to
agree that judges are, by and large, systematically incapable of constraining
majoritarian politics in times of emergency.24
Ratchets. The ratchet theory fails as well. Ratchet accounts typically
lack any mechanism that makes policies spill over into new areas or that
makes them stick after the emergency has passed. As others have
concluded, notably Geoffrey Stone, there is no evidence for a ratchet-like
trend towards an increasingly oppressive security state in American
history. 25  Those who fear the ratchet's power point to constitutional
trends-such as the rise of executive power-that are more plausibly the
result of long-term technological, demographic, and political changes, not
caused by recurrent emergencies. As for ratchets and judicial review, it is
unclear what judges, who must decide one case at a time, could do about
such long-term trends anyway.
There is much more to say about all of these subjects; I have merely tried
to map out the major questions. The overall point, however, is that
Ackerman's diagnosis of the ills that afflict emergency policymaking is
under-theorized and unclear.
II. PRESCRIPTION
I now turn to the relationship between Ackerman's diagnosis and
prescriptions. Part II.A offers a conceptual map of policy proposals, which
(as relevant here) come in two varieties: coherent and self-defeating. Part
II.B argues that Ackerman's proposals are of the latter type.
A. Self-defeating Proposals
I will begin with a simple schema for proposals and then explain how a
proposal might be self-defeating. In general, let us stipulate that action is a
function of agents' desires, beliefs, and opportunities. 26 In place of desires,
we might also say motivations or "preferences"; the important conceptual
differences between these ideas are immaterial here. Stipulate as well that a
24. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 114.
25. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition
Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism 530 (2004).
26. Jon Elster, Introduction to Rational Choice 1, 4 (Jon Elster ed., 1986).
[Vol. 75
SELF-DEFEA TING PROPOSALS
policy proposal contains both a diagnosis, or a theory-dependent
identification of a problem, and a prescription, or a recommendation for
action in light of the problem.
On this simple account, a coherent proposal is one whose diagnosis and
prescription make compatible assumptions about the desires, beliefs, and
opportunities of the relevant agents. A two-year-old child, say, wishes to
get a drink of water, is capable of doing so, but erroneously believes that
water appears out of thin air rather than from the tap. If I credibly inform
him otherwise, my proposal that he obtain water from the tap will be
consistent with his desires, (corrected) beliefs, and opportunities. The
proposal might still fail on any number of other grounds, of course-the
water main might break a moment after the proposal is made-but it will
not be internally inconsistent from the inception.
Conversely, a self-defeating proposal is one whose diagnosis and
prescription make inconsistent assumptions about agents' desires, beliefs,
or opportunities. There are, accordingly, three ways in which a proposal
might be self-defeating. First, it might offer a prescription that is
motivationally inconsistent with the diagnosis. Given the diagnosis, the
actors who have the ability to adopt the prescription have no desire to do so.
Second, the proposal might offer a prescription that is cognitively
inconsistent with the diagnosis. Given the diagnosis, the actors who have
the ability to adopt the prescription will believe that doing so is not in their
interests, even if it actually is. Third, the proposal might be inconsistent
with the external constraints on relevant agents that are presupposed by the
diagnosis. I will offer some brief remarks on each of these.
Motivational inconsistency. This is the most common and perhaps the
most familiar form of self-defeating proposal. In normative welfare
economics, the problem goes under the rubric of the "determinacy
paradox." 27 If government is understood as a benevolent maximizer of
social welfare, the economist's welfare-maximizing proposals are addressed
to the right audience. Suppose, however, that governmental motives are
endogenized, and that government officials are modeled as rationally self-
interested actors. Then it is not clear that anyone will be listening to the
economist's public-spirited proposals; the audience to whom they are
addressed will be motivated to adopt them only if they happen to
correspond to officials' self-interested aims. "[I]f what governments do is
the result somehow of equilibrium behavior of self-interested actors, then
advising governments is as senseless an activity as advising monopolists to
lower prices or advising the San Andreas fault to be quiet."'28
The determinacy paradox is ubiquitous in legal theory, particularly public
choice theory, which endogenizes the motivations of government officials
at the risk of rendering public-interested proposals fruitless. Consider the
27. Symposium, Determinancy Paradox, 9 Econ. & Pol. 205 (1997).
28. Brendan O'Flaherty & Jagdish Bhagwati, Will Free Trade With Political Science Put
Normative Economists Out of Work?, 9 Econ. & Pol. 207, 207 (1997).
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claim, in debates over criminal-justice policy, that the political system
invests too little in preventing crime, especially in urban areas:
[T]o the extent that crime victims, or those who live in fear of becoming
crime victims, are diffuse and poorly organized, and to the extent that a
large part of the population need not share the fear that these victims bear,
crime losses may be undervalued by local and state authorities, and are
certainly undervalued by federal government officials. 29
The resulting proposal is that government should offer publicly funded
''crime insurance," the argument being that the obligation to pay out to
crime victims will force government to internalize the social costs of
crime. 30  What is not explained, and is inexplicable given these
assumptions, is why the government that is (by hypothesis) not motivated to
take full account of the welfare of crime victims would choose to offer
crime insurance in the first place.
In examples like this, it is often unclear whether government officials are
acting on self-interested motives, or are instead politically constrained to
supply self-interested voters with the policies that they demand. In the
latter case, the proposal would be self-defeating in light of the external
constraints on the actors to whom the proposal is addressed, rather than
being directly self-defeating on motivational grounds. Although the
distinction is clear at the conceptual level, in operation the two mechanisms
generally produce the same results, so we need not worry too much about
how to classify particular examples.
Cognitive inconsistency. Suppose that the actor to whom the proposal is
addressed is both capable of adopting the proposal and would be motivated
to do so, if the actor were thinking clearly. Yet if the impetus for the
proposal is that the actor is not thinking clearly, the proposal may be self-
defeating. Where various forms of mental illness are at issue, the therapist
may propose that the patient take a drug that will suppress the condition.
The condition itself, however, often makes the prescription futile; it causes
the patient to refuse to take the drug, even though, let us assume, the patient
is physically capable of taking it, and doing so would in some sense really
be in the patient's interests. (By the latter clause, I mean to bracket the
interesting but tangential idea that the patient might face a problem of
multiple selves, such that the choice whether to be mentally ill or mentally
well might actually be a choice between two different identities.)
The same problem arises in legal theory when the theorist pegs the
diagnosis to cognitive biases in the actors to whom the proposal is
addressed. Consider the following pastiche of common arguments about
risk regulation: "Legislators are constrained to pander to publics who
overreact to low-probability risks because of various heuristics and biases.
Risk regulation should be entrusted to administrative experts, insulated
29. Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism-and Crime, 102
Mich. L. Rev. 268, 319 (2003).
30. Id. at 313.
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from politics, who are not susceptible to these distortions." 3 1 However, the
same social phenomena that distort first-order risk regulation by
legislatures-herding, availability cascades, and polarization-will also
distort second-order legislative decisions about creating, funding, and
overseeing expert risk regulators. If a scare about Chilean grapes arises and
the expert risk regulators are unmoved, panicky legislators can override the
regulators' decisions through new laws, refuse to fund their operations, or
haul them before committees for punitive oversight hearings. 32 Under the
first option, legislators must overcome the status quo hurdles of the
lawmaking process, which insulates the administrators to some extent, but
the second and third options do not face this problem.
Political constraints. The theorist may emphasize constraints, rather than
motivations or cognition, as determinants of behavior. Officials may be
understood as public spirited and having accurate beliefs (at least on
average, with no systematic distortions). As mentioned above, however,
the same officials, particularly elected ones, may also be tightly constrained
by self-interested constituents, and thus forced to behave as though self-
interested.
In cases where the diagnosis is that the actor is behaving badly-
according to some normative theory-because of political constraints, it is
futile and thus self-defeating to urge that the actor simply develop the
political will to overcome those constraints. This is the "voluntaristic
fallacy," which arises when the theorist ignores "organizational constraints
on individual behavior."33 Consider the argument that Congress has, for
political reasons, systematically abdicated war-making powers to the
President since World War II. Critics of this trend say, on the one hand,
that politics forces legislators to do so, and propose, on the other hand, that
legislators simply rouse themselves to fulfill their constitutional
responsibilities. 34  If the diagnosis is correct, the remedy is no more
31. Cf Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
Stan. L. Rev. 683, 685 (1999).
32. See Anne M. Joseph, Called to Account by Separated Powers: Regulatory Activity,
Oversight, and Turnover of Agency Leaders 8 (research proposal), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/students/curricularprograms/law-econ/pdf/Joseph-Research-P
roposal-forConLaw and EconConference.pdf.
33. Laura E. Garton & Barry Wellman, Social Impacts of Electronic Mail in
Organizations: A Review of the Research Literature (Nov. 1993), available at
http://www.dgp.toronto.edu/tp/papers/9313.html.
34. See John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and
Its Aftermath (1993). I am simplifying Ely's position here because he hopes that the courts
may prod Congress to act. See id. at 54-60. But his central proposal is just that Congress
should rouse itself to enact a strengthened version of the War Powers Resolution, see id. at
63-66, the same type of suggestion that Ely elsewhere mocks as "a halftime pep-talk
imploring [Congress] to pull up its socks and reclaim its rightful authority." Id. at 52. Ely
recognizes that political constraints prevent Congress from challenging the executive in
times of emergency (even if legislators desire to do so), and he thus expresses the hope that
"stepping up and taking responsibility on the question whether to fight a particular war for
which the President is beating the drums, and binding oneself in advance and outside any
particular context to do so, are at least potentially different matters." Id. at 65. Even apart
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sensible than urging a person to jump over a ten-story building by sheer
willpower.
A note on ideal and nonideal theory. In many settings, it is sensible to
recognize a division of labor: theorists propose, while politics disposes.
Perhaps pure theorists should delineate first-best or ideal schemes, 35 while
legal and political activists attempt to implement them. It might even be
best from the systemic point of view if theorists ignore political constraints,
thus avoiding a kind of self-censorship that inflicts social harms by filtering
out valuable ideas. 36
Yet this point does not save proposals that are self-defeating on the
grounds described above. These proposals are not merely ideal schemes,
that might or might not pass through the political filter. They are already
nonideal or second-best schemes designed to cure some extant deviation
from the first-best, as when the diagnosis is that ill-motivated governments
fail to adopt optimal crime-control policies and the prescription is crime
insurance, or when the diagnosis is that panicky legislators adopt bad risk-
regulation policies and the prescription is expert risk regulation. The
problem with such proposals is that even as nonideal schemes, they are
internally inconsistent; there is no saving them by reference to the virtues of
ideal theory. In any event, Ackerman does not at all take himself to be
offering a (merely) ideal scheme. His ambition is to propose something that
might be enacted-which is the main reason he rejects the possibility of
casting his proposals as a constitutional amendment, rather than a
framework statute. 37
B. The Framework Statute
With this conceptual map in hand, we may survey Ackerman's proposals.
Motivations. Recall that Ackerman attributes self-interested motivations
to the relevant actors. Presidents, enjoying agency slack, seek
opportunistically to expand their power. Although Ackerman does not
speak as directly about the motivations of legislators, he hints that they
defer to the executive for self-interested reasons. 38 Perhaps Ackerman's
implicit idea is that legislative power is a collective good and will be
from the central problem that Congress has not been able to bind "itself' where war and
emergencies are concerned, as I suggest below, there is a further problem: the very same
abstraction from context on which Ely relies to loosen the political constraints also saps
legislators' motivation to take any action, given the opportunity cost of foregoing other
projects with concrete short-term payoffs. The War Powers Resolution might be depicted as
the rare moment of Ackermanian higher lawmaking in which legislators overcame this
motivational deficit, but feasible proposals should not count upon the repetition of an
exceptional event. I expand upon this dilemma below.
35. I use "first-best" and "ideal" as rough synonyms, although the former is an economic
concept, the latter a philosophical one; the imprecision is not harmful for present purposes.
36. See Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 Minn. L.
Rev. 1154, 1172 (2006).
37. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 123.
38. See id. at 18-19.
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undersupplied by the collective action of self-regarding individual
legislators. 39
What this means is that even accepting all of Ackerman's premises, the
very motivations his diagnosis ascribes to the relevant actors will defeat his
proposals for reform. Begin with legislators. It is quite predictable, given
Ackerman's premises, that legislators will use his framework statute as a
pretext for deferring to bad executive actions. They might acquiesce in the
measures advocated by the executive on the grounds that executive power
will expire shortly, and so they might agree to worse abuses than they
would if Ackerman's statute did not exist, and the legislators confronted the
problem of expiration directly. The supermajoritarian escalator is an exotic
species in the genus of sunset provisions; and sunset provisions reduce
legislators' ex ante incentives to act responsibly, all else equal, because the
costs of acting irresponsibly at any given time are lower than would
otherwise be the case.40 Ackerman has not taken adequate account of the
fact that the framework statute, if enacted, will be common knowledge to all
participants, who will anticipate its effects and adjust their behavior
accordingly.
The motivations that Ackerman attributes to the executive will also
undermine his scheme. Recall that Ackerman pictures an executive who
seeks not only to expand his power, but also to do so through steps that are
irreversible or costly to reverse-the ratchet effect. Given these
motivations, the framework statute encourages the President to act
opportunistically to expand his power as quickly as possible, in the first
period of the emergency when his political freedom or power is at a
maximum under Ackerman's scheme, rather than risk waiting until a point
where a supermajority no longer extends the state of emergency. If there
are executive actions that can be taken during emergencies and are costly to
reverse afterwards-a premise that I have questioned but that Ackerman
accepts-then Ackerman's scheme gives the President every incentive to
carry them out as soon as possible, before the legal hurdles escalate.
Ackerman assumes the contrary, saying that "[t]he president knows that
he will have a tough time sustaining supermajorities in the future, and this
will lead him to use his powers cautiously. The public will bridle if his
underlings run amok, acting in arbitrary ways that go beyond the needs of
the situation." 41  For "cautiously," however, one should substitute
"aggressively," given Ackerman's views about executive motivations. The
passing suggestion that political constraints rule out presidential aggression
is inconsistent with everything else Ackerman says; if it is true, then the
President does not enjoy as much agency slack as Ackerman supposes, and
there is no need for the framework statute to tie the President down in the
39. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 915, 950-60 (2005).
40. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=911603.
41. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 81.
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first place. This is not a logical disproof, to be sure; it is just possible that
agency slack could be great enough to permit the President to take small
steps towards self-aggrandizement, but not so great as to allow him to move
aggressively. But it would be quite fortuitous if the values of variables like
agency slack happened to fall right in the narrow band necessary to make
Ackerman's proposal coherent; and Ackerman gives us no reason to think
that they do.
And given Ackerman's premises, presidential declarations of emergency
would be pretextual in any event. Ackerman seemingly gives the President
absolute authority to declare the start of the emergency, even if only for a
week or two, and it is clear that judges will have no real choice but to defer
to the emergency declaration even if it is arguably pretextual. That has
been the experience under the National Emergencies Act 42 and the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act.43 Under the latter statute,
a court said that the President had unreviewable discretion to determine that
the government of Nicaragua satisfied the statutory requirement of "an
unusual and extraordinary threat,"44 while under the former statute
"anything the President says is a national emergency is a national
emergency." 45 Given the opportunistic and power-maximizing executive
that Ackerman supposes, and the supine posture of the courts, bad-faith
declarations of emergency are inevitable.
Ackerman is aware of this Achilles' heel in his framework and tries to
armor it with a proviso: The state of emergency may only be triggered by
an actual attack, not a showing that emergency powers are necessary to
preempt an imminent attack-the theory being that a declaration of
emergency in advance of an actual attack, based on a finding of "clear and
present danger," would leave too much scope for manipulation and
pretext. 46 This might solve the problem, but at far too high a price.
Consider that the law of self-defense, both for individuals and for states,
always allows aggressive action not only in response to an actual attack, but
to preempt an imminent threat. 47 Is Ackerman seriously suggesting that a
President must wait until an attack has occurred and lives are lost in order
to take extraordinary measures? If so, then the impulse to minimize the risk
of executive opportunism has become an id~efixe that is crowding out all
other considerations.
Lord Hoffman stated in the House of Lords-before the July 7, 2005
terrorist attacks in London-that "[t]he real threat to the life of the
42. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2000).
43. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2000).
44. Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1192 (D. Mass. 1986), affd,
814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
45. Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive's Crisis Powers
with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1453, 1458 & n.27 (1979).
46. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 91.
47. See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 729, 735 (2004).
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nation... comes not from terrorism but from [invalid] laws .... 48
Ackerman, going Lord Hoffman one better, seems to be saying that a threat
to the lives of the actual people who make up the nation's citizenry is to be
discounted until an attack has already occurred. Even after the attack,
Ackerman says that "September 11, to my mind, represents the low end for
the legitimate imposition of a state of emergency." 49 This implies, and the
surrounding discussion confirms, 50 that an attack resulting in, say, a mere
2000 deaths would not suffice. Here, as elsewhere, Ackerman is obsessed
with minimizing executive abuses to zero, no matter what the collateral
costs. Executive abuses should be optimized, not minimized; they are an
inevitable by-product of the optimal security regime and should be weighed
against the offsetting benefits, such as saving people's lives.
Cognition and emotion. Ackerman's statute is also a poorly designed
cure for the cognitive distortions, arising from emotional influences, that he
diagnoses.51  If his framework statute is needed to prevent panicking
legislators from deferring to bad executive actions, then it seems unlikely
that it can have that effect. A panicky Congress can simply ignore the
supermajoritarian escalator and approve new statutory powers or a new
statutory framework by majority rule; the PATRIOT Act, which Ackerman
abhors, 52 could have simply included one panicky section sweeping away
any extant framework statutes limiting presidential power. The public does
not usually choose officials on the basis of their ability to stay calm during
emergencies. There are too many other relevant considerations. Most
politicians are elected on the basis of their ability to deliver the goods
during ordinary times. Although sometimes a politician's background
contains indications of emotional discipline, the latter is not a salient issue
in political contests.
Again, we may if we like put this point in terms of political constraints.
It is questionable whether elected officials can resist political pressures
when citizens panic. Below, I adduce some evidence that precommitments
are especially likely to come undone during national-security emergencies,
whatever their binding power in normal times. During a national
emergency, a government that dismisses citizens' fears as irrational may
inflame rather than quell those fears. If the public firmly believes that a
threat exists, official assurances to the contrary do no good; instead, it is
evidence to the public that the government is unprepared and insufficiently
48. A and others v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C.
68, 132.
49. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 92.
50. Id.
51. Ackerman seems to assume throughout that fear is an emotional influence that
distorts cognition. I will adopt this assumption, bracketing two other possibilities: (1) Fear
is an emotional influence that improves cognition; (2) emotions themselves necessarily
subsume cognitive judgments. On these issues, see generally Jon Elster, Alchemies of the
Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought:
The Intelligence of Emotions (2001).
52. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 2.
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vigorous. Waving the Constitution at the public will not help when the
public believes that the Constitution itself is being threatened; much less
will a mere framework statute provide a barrier against widespread panic.
Cognition, information, and uncertainty. Let us focus briefly on the role
of information costs and uncertainty in Ackerman's prescriptions. Even
where cognition is undistorted, in the sense that officials' estimates show no
systematic biases and are accurate on average, information is still costly,
and the uncertain character of policymaking is especially serious during
emergencies. Consider the role of uncertainty at two points: just after an
attack occurs and when legislators are considering enacting Ackerman's
framework statute in advance of a future attack. In the' first situation,
Ackerman argues that "the arts of risk management are radically
inappropriate in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.... [W]e are suddenly
thrown into a world of unknowable uncertainty, not calculable risk."'53
Ackerman's remedy for this is "reassurance" through granting the state
extraordinary powers for a brief period, followed by a rapid return to
normalcy through the supermajoritarian escalator.
The sensible response to genuine uncertainty, however, is the maximin
principle, which says that decisionmakers should choose the course of
action with the highest minimum payoff, the best worst-case scenario.
Maximin is why governments take draconian measures after a surprise
attack, and given Ackerman's premises, the maximin strategy should be
pursued as long as the uncertainty lasts. Ackerman's proposal for a rapid
return to normalcy supposes that the government's and the public's
responses are driven by emotion-driven panic, which decays over time. But
if there is genuine uncertainty, maximin need not be a symptom of panic; it
is as rational a response as uncertainty permits.54 Ackerman is confused
about this; he invokes uncertainty and yet also warns that "[it] will be
tempting for the executive to respond by focusing on a few worst-case
scenarios without seriously considering whether other greater dangers
exist."' 55 If responding to those other "greater dangers" produces a greater
minimum payoff, then a rational executive pursuing maximin will do so.
What is true is that, as Judge Posner says,
[w]hen a nation is attacked, there is at first great uncertainty about the
gravity of the attack, so naturally and sensibly the government responds
with severe measures. The longer the struggle initiated by the attack
continues, the more accurate the assessment of danger becomes, and so it
becomes possible to scale back the repressive measures .... 56
53. Id. at 45.
54. Other strategies may be pursued under uncertainty, see R. Duncan Luce & Howard
Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey 278-86 (1957), but maximin
is not inferior to them and is the most common.
55. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 86.
56. Richard A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of
9/11, at 188-89 (2005).
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The government will itself loosen its grip as its information improves, not
as the result of an externally imposed and artificial framework.
In the second situation, where legislators are considering a framework
statute to regulate future emergencies, Ackerman overlooks the sheer
cognitive load imposed by the ex ante approach, given the high costs of
information about the future-an especially serious consideration where
emergencies and national security are at issue. The framework statute relies
on elaborate procedures to deal with events that by their nature are
unpredictable, fluid, and therefore unlikely to play out according to
conceptions held years in advance. An instructive contrast is provided by
the various emergency provisions in foreign constitutions, which are by and
large extremely vague57-hardly clearer than the common law pattern of
judicial deference during emergencies that has dominated in the United
States. This convergence on vague standards rather than specific rules
probably reflects an international consensus that emergency powers cannot
be sensibly determined in advance because the requirements of future
emergencies are so difficult to predict. It is better to provide that the
executive may exercise emergency powers, and then allow the political
system, judges included, to come to a consensus about their appropriate
scope once the emergency begins.
Ackerman recommends that we might "[s]imply recalibrate the speed of
the supermajoritarian escalator-changing the extension periods from two
to three months, say, thereby slowing the rate of ascent to the
supermajoritarian heights." 58 If the recalibration is meant to occur long
before the emergency, when the framework statute is being enacted, there is
no basis for doing so; legislators are behind too thick a veil of uncertainty to
know what will work during the next emergency, whose shape and
consequences will be unpredictable. The advantage of the veil of
uncertainty is that it promotes impartiality; its disadvantages are that it
suppresses information and diminishes the political motivation to act at all,
because self-interested political actors will substitute projects that more
clearly benefit themselves. 59 Where emergencies, war, and threats to
national security are at issue, the latter effects are more likely and more
costly than in other policy domains.
Perhaps, however, the recalibration is meant to occur during or after the
emergency-which is, after all, when new information about the costs and
benefits of the framework statute will become available. But this just
emphasizes that the framework statute is no constraint on emergency
57. See Eur. Comm'n for Democracy Through Law, Emergency Powers (1995)
(overview of emergency-powers provisions). Ackerman goes as far afield as South Africa to
find a constitutional model for his supermajoritarian escalator, see Ackerman, supra note 1,
at 89-90, but South Africa is not comparable to the United States on many or any of the
political, economic, or strategic dimensions relevant to the law of emergency powers.
58. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 115.
59. Adrian Vermeule, Veil ofIgnorance Rules in Constitutional Law, Il1 Yale L.J. 399,
399-402 (2001).
2006]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
decisionmaking. The tinkering will, on Ackerman's premises, occur under
conditions of public panic and executive opportunism. On that picture, we
might expect to see an "extension" of emergency powers not from two
months to three, but from two months to three years, or-more probably-
the outright repeal of the framework statute itself once the need for
modification is acknowledged.
There is a dilemma here arising from the interaction among cognitive and
motivational problems, information costs, and the timing of framework
enactments. On the one hand, framework legislation enacted after the
emergency has come to pass is likely to suffer from the motivational and
cognitive distortions that Ackerman fears. On the other hand, legislators
are unlikely to enact a framework statute to regulate emergencies in the
hazy future. Although in such a position legislators would act impartially,
behind a veil of uncertainty that suppresses knowledge of the statute's
short-run political payoffs, that very uncertainty saps legislators' motivation
to act, and thus makes it less likely that any legislation will be enacted in
the first place.60 The high opportunity costs of political action, constricted
agenda space in Congress, the horizon of reelection, and the tendency to
discount the future all push legislators to rank projects by the amount of
benefit they produce in the near term. Projects that will produce large
collective benefits in the long run, but whose distributive valence is
uncertain, will generally be subordinated to projects that produce larger
factional benefits in the short run. Legislating for the remote future
replaces self-interested motivation with impartial reason, but impartial
motives are often too weak to produce action. To be sure, sometimes
framework statutes slip between these two opposing forces in moments of
"higher lawmaking," but these are rare events. A proposal that must count
on the occurrence of the improbable is itself implausible.
Political constraints. Ackerman's framework statute is supposed to
perform a constitutional function. It reorganizes governmental powers
during an emergency, and then ensures that they return to normal after the
emergency expires. A statute could, in principle, perform such
constitutional functions by aligning the various parties' expectations about
the future, which then provide a basis for objecting to usurpations or
interference when the emergency occurs. However, history shows that
statutory limitations are weak during emergencies. The War Powers
Resolution, which limited the circumstances under which the President
could use military force and imposed various reporting requirements when
the President did use force, has been ignored. As I mentioned above, the
National Emergencies Act similarly imposed restrictions and reporting
requirements on the President's power to declare emergencies, and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act limited the President's




statutes has had much of an impact on the behavior of executives. 61
Finally, after 9/11 the President undertook a program of domestic
warrantless surveillance, one that in the view of many commentators clearly
violates the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.62  Public opinion,
however, is divided about the program's legality. 63 As of this writing, there
seems little prospect that Congress will retaliate; the most likely outcome is
some sort of legislative ratification of the program, which means that the
President will have effectively annulled the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act as well as the other framework statutes governing
executive action in emergencies.
The reason for the failure of statutory frameworks is plain. When an
emergency or war or crisis arises, the executive needs flexibility; because
statutory limitations determined in advance can only reduce flexibility, and
do so in a way that does not anticipate the particular requirements of a new
emergency, no one has any ex post interest in insisting that these limitations
be respected. Ackerman acknowledges the grim historical record but
provides no valid reason for thinking that his framework statute-which is
far more ambitious than the other ones-might fare differently.
Ackerman says that his framework statute arranges the status quo
differently than does the National Emergencies Act, and that this makes all
the difference. 64 Under the latter, Congress must take affirmative action to
override a presidential declaration of emergencies, whereas under
Ackerman's proposal the President's emergency powers will lapse
automatically unless Congress votes to extend the emergency. 65 But this is
to confuse the legal status quo with the factual status quo; the latter is set by
presidential action on the ground, whatever the law may say. The War
Powers Resolution, which Ackerman barely mentions, sets the status quo in
the same way that his framework statute would, by requiring the President
to obtain congressional approval for deployments of U.S. forces after the
initial sixty-day period has passed. And the War Powers Resolution is
utterly defunct, as shown by President Clinton's clear violation of the Act
during the Kosovo conflict, a seventy-eight-day military campaign
conducted without congressional authorization. 66 As Kosovo reveals, the
President's central power is to move first, in the world beyond the statute
books, and thus confront Congress with afait accompli.67 The ill-motivated
61. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale L.J.
1385, 1412-21 (1989).
62. See Beth Nolan et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. Rev. of Books,
Feb. 9, 2006, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18650.
63. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Remains Divided About Wiretapping Controversy,
Gallup Poll, Feb. 16, 2006, http://galluppoll.com/content/?ci=21499.
64. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 123.
65. See id. at 4.
66. Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War
Powers Resolution, 42 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1149, 1154, 1182 (2001).
67. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,
15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 132 (1999).
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President that Ackerman pictures will do just that, and the politically
constrained Congress that history reveals will be both unwilling and largely
powerless to do anything about it, however the legal status quo is nominally
set.
One can always throw on sandbags to shore up an argument. Perhaps the
War Powers Resolution involves foreign affairs, where there are fewer
salient victims of presidential law-violation to spur congressional reaction,
while violations of Ackerman's framework statute would produce
politically consequential victims. 68  But in the setting of a domestic
emergency, the persons the President can claim to be protecting, or
avenging, will be more salient and politically important as well; consider
the political effect of images of the 9/11 victims. And violations of some
statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, may never
produce salient victims at all, if it is unclear whom the government has
surveilled. Accounts of this sort are inherently speculative and ambiguous,
in part because the underlying mechanisms of political psychology are as
yet poorly understood.
Emergencies and time-inconsistency. The general problem with
Ackerman's proposal, which runs throughout the foregoing points, is that of
the time-inconsistency of emergency policymaking, or the demonstrated
inability of Congress to effectively bind future Congresses where
emergencies and war are concerned. 69 The point here is not that framework
statutes enacted at one time never constrain legislators or other actors at a
later time. It is that they are least likely to constrain in the settings
Ackerman is discussing and given the conditions he diagnoses. Where
emergencies provoke panic, unleash socially harmful motivations, and
encourage legislators to defer to executive power, earlier framework
legislation is most likely to be circumvented or repealed outright. Given
Ackerman's premises about motivations, cognition, and political
constraints, the framework statute will become a dead letter, as have the
War Powers Resolution and the National Emergencies Act. Once the
emergency begins, there is no way to force Congress to abide by the
supermajoritarian escalator, and there is no prospect that Congress will
retaliate against the executive for violating the framework. Nor will courts
do any better, in all likelihood. In principle, courts could refuse to defer to
executive action undertaken if the relevant supermajority rule is not obeyed,
but in practice courts tend to obey subsequent majorities that ignore
supermajority rules-and as Ackerman intermittently acknowledges,
judicial deference is especially likely during an emergency.
68. Conservation with Professor Bruce Ackerman, Sterling Professor of Law and
Political Science, Yale University, at the Fordham Law Review Symposium "A New
Constitutional Order?" (March 24-25, 2006).
69. For skepticism about the constraining force of legal precommitments during
subsequent emergencies, see Martha Minow, What is the Greatest Evil?, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
2134, 2166-67 (2005) (reviewing Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an
Age of Terror (2004)).
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It is odd that Ackerman simultaneously (1) denies that Congress can
enact an entrenched statute that binds future Congresses; 70  (2)
acknowledges that he needs a stronger commitment mechanism than an
ordinary, non-entrenched statute; 71 but (3) refuses to cast his proposal as a
call for constitutional amendment. What's left? Aware of this problem,
Ackerman partly retraces his steps, amending his concession that courts are
ineffective guardians of civil liberties during emergencies. Should a
panicky Congress repeal the framework statute, Ackerman suggests, courts
can act as "guardians of the emergency constitution," 72 denying Congress
the authority to suspend habeas corpus or adopt other strong measures
unless and until a supermajoritarian escalator is restored. So the suggestion
is that the escalator should be deemed constitutionally required, not just
permissible, and by judicial declaration made in the midst of an emergency
and resting on no discernible constitutional text, precedent, or other
conventional legal materials. Courts have rarely, if ever, summoned this
sort of political courage in the face of joint action by Congress and the
executive during emergencies; 73 and if courts could be so bold, then they
could just enforce constitutional civil liberties directly, and there would be
no need for a detour through an elaborate framework statute.
CONCLUSION
The framework approach is infeasible or even counterproductive, given
Ackerman's premises about the motivations of legislators and the
executive, their political psychology, and the constraints on legislators'
behavior. The proposal to promulgate an "emergency constitution" 74
through a framework statute is self-defeating-a warning to theorists who
fail to calibrate diagnosis with remedy.
70. Compare Ackerman, supra note 1, at 166-67, with Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Yale L.J. 1665, 1686-87 (2002).
On this view, there is no constitutional barrier to entrenching legislation; but entrenched
rules are especially likely to be circumvented or violated where emergencies subsequently
arise.
71. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 104, 134 (acknowledging that the framework statute
could be overridden or repealed by simple majority, thereby undermining the effectiveness
of the supermajoritarian escalator).
72. Id. at 105 (emphasis omitted).
73. See generally William H. Rehnquist, All The Laws But One: Civil Liberties in
Wartime (1998); Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the
Modem Democracies (1948); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on
Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2673, 2679 (2005); Christina E. Wells & Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Foreword to Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Fear and Risk Perception in
Times of Democratic Crisis, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 897 (2004); John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and
the War on Terrorism, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427 (2003).
74. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 3.
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